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INTRODUCTION
In July of 2002, the George W. Bush administration published the
“National Strategy for Homeland Security,” which begins with an open letter
from President Bush to the people of the United States. The letter introduced
the American public to “Homeland Security,” a concept Bush repeatedly
framed in relational terms—as a “national strategy, not a federal strategy,” as a
“shared responsibility” across the various levels of American government, and
as a function of “mutually supporting state, local and private-sector
strategies.”1
The Homeland Security strategy of cooperative security governance
appeared to have broad political support when the Bush administration created
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and tasked the agency with
orchestrating law enforcement collaboration across federal, state, and local
government. Congress passed the federal legislation appropriating the funds
for DHS by impressive margins: 299–121 in the US House of Representatives
and 90–9 in the US Senate.2 Less than a year after DHS began operations, it
incorporated the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a subsidiary,
renaming the division the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency
(ICE).3 ICE officials immediately initiated a cooperative immigration

1. Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, to Americans
(July 16, 2002), in THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (July 2002), available
at http://www.subjecting-freedom.org/pdf/National_Strategy_of_Homeland_Security_2002.pdf.
This important briefing from President Bush established Homeland Security as an administrative
framework based, in part, on norms of cooperation across the various levels of government. The
following passage indicates the manner in which the Bush administration introduced the concept
of Homeland Security to the nation. “On October 8, I established the Office of Homeland
Security within the White House and, as its first responsibility, directed it to produce the first
National Strategy for Homeland Security. . . . This is a national strategy, not a federal strategy.
We must rally our entire society to overcome a new and very complex challenge. Homeland
security is a shared responsibility. In addition to a national strategy, we need compatible,
mutually supporting state, local, and private-sector strategies. Individual volunteers must
channel their energy and commitment in support of the national and local strategies. My intent in
publishing the National Strategy for Homeland Security is to help Americans achieve a shared
cooperation in the area of homeland security for years to come. . . . We have produced a
comprehensive strategy that is based on the principles of cooperation and partnership. As a result
of this Strategy, firefighters will be better equipped to fight fires, police officers better armed to
fight crime, businesses better able to protect their data and information systems, and scientists
better able to fight Mother Nature’s deadliest diseases. We will not achieve these goals
overnight . . . but we will achieve them” [emphasis added]. Id.
2. Donald P. Moynihan, Homeland Security and U.S. Public Management Policy Agenda,
18 GOVERNANCE 171, 181 (2005).
3. Sen. Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law
Enforcement in the Realm of Immigrant Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 325, 327 (2005).
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enforcement program structured to stem the flow of unauthorized immigration
and protect the nation from terrorism and other threats to domestic security.4
Between 2001 and 2008, a number of subnational jurisdictions balked at
the ICE proposal of cooperative immigration enforcement, choosing to abstain
in part or in full from the federal government’s augmented immigration
enforcement apparatus.5 After introducing the Secure Communities program in
2008, ICE officials responded to state and local sanctuary policies by
representing that subnational police participation was mandatory rather than
elective.6 Unconvinced, state and local public officials pressed the issue and
presented their alternative legal findings. Only then did ICE acknowledge that
it could not “commandeer” state and local police into the revamped
immigration enforcement program.7
This brief narrative captures the second wave of “immigrant sanctuary”—a
term used to describe the state and local government practice of restricting
police departments from participation in immigration enforcement. The
immigrant sanctuaries of the Homeland Security era are of unique significance
given the ongoing dialogue among legal scholars regarding the significance of
local law enforcement participation in national and domestic security
administration after 2001, as well as the legal framework structuring
cooperative security governance.8
Despite the broad powers wielded by the federal government in security
administration, the Supreme Court’s holding in Printz v. United States serves

4. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A
Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 21 (2006).
5. Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1466 (2006).
6. Paloma Esquivel, Federal Immigration Enforcement is Mandatory, Memo Says, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/08/local/la-me-ice-foia-20120109.
7. See Julia Preston, Immigration Program Is Rejected By 3rd State, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2011, at A13; Letter from Daniel H. Ragsdale, Acting Director of ICE, to Mike Thompson, U.S.
House Representative (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjus
tice.org/files/2014_02_25%20Thompson-signed-response-ICE.pdf.
8. See generally Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of
Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1231 (2004); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side:
Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1277
(2004); Harris, supra note 4. The American public has also grown skeptical of the breadth of
federal power in the field of security. Polls show that the daily revelations of secret government
surveillance programs and the ever-expanding federal security infrastructure leave the polity
questioning whether security governance is democratically accountable or instead operating as an
autonomous system largely impervious to public opinion and conventional political power.
Obama’s NSA Speech Has Little Impact on Skeptical Public, PEW RES. CTR., Jan. 20, 2014,
http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/20/obamas-nsa-speech-has-little-impact-on-skeptical-pub
lic/; see also Most Young Americans Say Snowden Has Served the Public Interest, PEW RES.
CTR., Jan. 22, 2014, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/22/most-young-americanssay-snowden-has-served-the-public-interest/.
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as a substantial check against federal overreach.9 Hand wringing by legal
scholars over the Court’s reasoning in Printz and the rigid rules against
commandeering attached to this reasoning10 have obscured the fact that the
case now stands as a bulwark against the expansion of federal authority over
state, county, and local police. Given the holding in Printz, ICE cannot require
the active participation of subnational police in immigration enforcement and
must instead—despite its previous assertions to the contrary—solicit this
support through state and local governments who may, in turn, participate in
immigration enforcement of their own volition.
How does an elective rather than legally mandated system of cooperative
security governance impact domestic security? Opponents of the Court’s
decision in Printz contend that the rule against federal commandeering of state
and local police hamstrings the federal government in times of national
emergency, compromising the security of the citizenry.11 Supporters argue in
response that Printz would likely galvanize public debate about the very
conception of domestic and national security, as it gives state and local
governments clear legal authority to establish formal bureaucratic opposition to
the federal ambition to expand security infrastructure through the incorporation
of subnational police.12
The case of immigrant sanctuary will not resolve the debate among the
justices in Printz or among the legal scholars concerned with the impact of the
decision on the contours of federalism in contemporary American society. It
can, however, offer empirical evidence helpful in investigating a few of the
primary, yet speculative, claims made by advocates on either side of the
commandeering debate. In the empirical portion of this article, I present the
case of immigrant sanctuary as a platform from which to consider the promise
and peril of anti-commandeering jurisprudence in the Homeland Security era.
My empirical analysis of immigrant sanctuary is based on an original dataset I
created, made up of coded data from seventy-five immigrant sanctuary laws
and policies and basic demographic information from the associated
jurisdictions.
I build a backdrop upon which to consider the data analysis in Part I, by
explicating the anti-commandeering rule and outlining the legal debate over its
costs, benefits, and constitutionality in the Homeland Security era. In Part II, I

9. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
10. See generally Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Kevin
Todd Butler, Printz v. United States: Tenth Amendment Limitations on Federal Access to the
Mechanisms of State Government, 49 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1998); Neil S. Siegel,
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629 (2006).
11. Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. See generally Althouse, supra note 8; Young, supra note 8.
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provide an overview of the sanctuary policies enacted between 2001 and 2008,
followed by data analysis that allows for an evaluation of some of the core
claims made by opponents and proponents of the Printz decision. I complete
the analytical portion of the paper in Part III by drawing the legal theory of
expressive state action to the immigrant sanctuary case and the
commandeering debate. The expressive theory of state action is especially
salient in the context of bilateral security governance, where federal
conceptions and theories of security tend to take shape unilaterally (i.e., by
federal “say-so”) and outside of the public eye and public discourse. I conclude
with a few thoughts about the importance of combative federalism to the fields
of crime and security governance.
I. PRINTZ AND THE PROSPECT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY GOVERNANCE
A.

The Case Against Federal Commandeering in the Homeland Security Era

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Printz, established a bright-line
rule prohibiting the federal “commandeering” of state and local police.13 The
holding in Printz invalidated a provision in the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act that required Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs) at the
state and local levels to provide temporary assistance to federal officials in the
regulation of gun purchases.14 Citing the dual sovereignty principle of
federalist governance and its holding in New York v. United States, the
majority in Printz held that though the Constitution permits the federal
government to require or prohibit specific acts by individuals, the federal
government may not compel state governments to assist in the regulation of
such acts.15
The Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power
among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we
may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient
16
solution to the crisis of the day.

Given the scope of federal power in the field of security governance, the
Court’s rationale in Printz deserves careful consideration in the Homeland
Security era, where international and domestic threat gives the federal
government great deference in shaping the public’s conception of the condition
popularly known as “security” as well as the means by which to establish the
condition.17 Federal power in the fields of crime and security governance now
extends beyond the scope of federal security infrastructure to the level of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 925, 935.
Id. at 933–34.
Id. at 918–20.
Id. at 933 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992)).
See generally PAT O’MALLEY, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND GOVERNMENT (2004).
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subnational government, where law enforcement officials are increasingly
subject to the national security agenda and related initiatives. In many
instances, these initiatives conflict with the local crime control agenda and, in a
more general sense, the local understanding of the “secure community.”18 The
Court’s commitment to preserving a system of decentralized governance
through the anti-commandeering rule might now seem prescient given the
revelations of secret and expansive federal surveillance in the document leaks
by the former federal contractor, Edward Snowden,19 and related public
concerns about the extent to which federal security institutions remain
accountable to the democratic process.20
B.

“State Sovereignty” as a Threat to Domestic Security

Few, if any, critics of the anti-commandeering rule call for the Court to
permit unrestrained federal commandeering of state and local police. Most
contend, from a functionalist orientation, that the Court’s bright-line rule
against commandeering is imprudent given the myriad of exigent
circumstances in which the federal government may need to enlist local police
in a law enforcement or security initiative.21 The common example within this
line of argument is the complex terrorist attack that spans two or more
jurisdictions. However, climate change and the need for intergovernmental
coordination to protect against violent storms, flooding, and related mass
displacement seem just as significant. Many of the problems arising from
Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina were immediate and dire; they transcended
jurisdictional boundaries and required cooperation across the federal, state, and
local levels of government. Given these circumstances, what sense would it
make to hamstring federal officials with a bright-line rule that bars federal
commandeering of state and local police?
In his dissent in Printz, Justice Stevens describes the value of centralized
security administration in uncertain times.22

18. See generally Daniel M. Stewart, Collaboration Between Federal and Local Law
Enforcement: An Examination of Texas Police Chiefs’ Perceptions, 14 POLICE Q. 407 (2011);
David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635 (2005); Veena
Dubal, The Demise of Community Policing? The Impact of Post-9/11 Federal Surveillance
Programs on Local Law Enforcement, 19 ASIAN AM. L.J. 35 (2012).
19. Editorial, Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2014, http://www.ny
times.com/2014/01/02/opinion/edward-snowden-whistle-blower.html?_r=0.
20. See Obama’s NSA Speech Has Little Impact on Skeptical Public, supra note 8. Despite
its concerns about centralized authority, the Court has granted the federal government
considerable deference in security matters. See generally Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the
Courts, and National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 906–25 (1990).
21. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939–70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
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Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a
military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall an epidemic, or
perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national response
23
before federal personnel can be made available to respond.

Stevens determined the imposition on local law enforcement officers in the
event of federal commandeering to be modest and the Court’s “absolute
principle” barring the enlistment of local law enforcement to be a dangerous
overreaction.24 Many in the legal academic community have expressed similar
disapproval regarding the majority’s method of argument,25 its claims that the
rule barring commandeering bolsters federalist values,26 and its general
insensitivity to the value of commandeering in the case of national
emergency.27
The most concerning aspect of the national security objection may be the
suggestion that the public could suffer grave harm in a time of crisis if the
federal government is not allowed a free hand to coordinate intergovernmental
collaboration.28 Fortunately, this claim can be evaluated empirically. In the
following section, I use the case of immigrant sanctuary to investigate the
specific claim made by supporters of the Printz decision regarding its impact
on the federal government’s ability to secure cooperative arrangements across
the various levels of government in the specific context of a national crisis. To
my knowledge, there has not been a study that assesses subnational
government utilization of the anti-commandeering rule in the context of
security governance, despite much speculation regarding national vulnerability
as a consequence of the rule and countervailing claims regarding the rule’s
unique ability to temper federal government power.
II. IMMIGRANT SANCTUARY AS A TEST CASE
A.

Three Propositions Regarding the Relationship Between National
Security, National Emergency, and the Rule Against Commandeering

Scholars wary of the expansive growth of federal power in the era of
Homeland Security and the War on Terror have identified the anti-

23. Id. at 940.
24. Id. at 966–67, 977.
25. See generally Butler, supra note 10. See also Caminker, supra note 10.
26. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1630–57.
27. One commenter expressed his dismay that the anti-commandeering rule was “so broad,
so insensitive” that it did not provide for leeway even when the federal government
commandeered in order to satisfy a compelling government interest—”for example,
commandeering of state and local officials in the wake of a terrorist attack or devastating
hurricane.” Id. at 1655.
28. Id. at 1686 n.202 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 940 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
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commandeering rule as one of the few mechanisms moderating this power.29 In
response to scholars and jurists who support situational commandeering—
particularly in the context of national emergency—commandeering opponents
have held to the notion that the Court’s decision in Printz protects social
interests easily forgotten in moments when warnings of threat to national
security seem pervasive and unrelenting.30 Though the claims of
commandeering opponents are not easily confirmed or dismissed, I look to test
their validity using data from the immigrant sanctuary case.
To this end, I have identified three key assertions made by commandeering
opponents regarding the anti-commandeering rule and its ramifications for
security governance.
1. Commandeering opponents argue that in the Homeland Security era,
the concepts of “national security” and “national emergency” are a
point of contention.31 For instance, commandeering opponents have
criticized Justice Stevens’s assertion in Printz that high murder rates in
the United States constitute a national emergency that might require an
intergovernmental response orchestrated by the federal government.32
They argue that the cause of violent crime is best understood through
an investigation of local milieu and, more fundamentally, that the
“national security/emergency” labels should be subject to public
debate.33 The anti-commandeering rule is thought to have the effect of
decentralizing government power in the context of such a debate,
undermining the hegemonic quality of various narratives pertaining to
the nation’s security. In the absence of federal commandeering, state
autonomy in crime and security governance would, in theory, reveal
“national security” to be a variable social construction rather than an
essential and knowable entity.
2. Commandeering opponents also maintain that when states abstain from
federal enforcement initiatives they are likely to engage and enrich a
national debate about conceptions of emergency, threat, and national
security. In addition to revealing dissent regarding the true meaning of
security, state autonomy is thought to provide the discursive space for a
dynamic and inclusive debate between state and local collectives and
federal officials regarding “best practices” and best perspectives in the
field of security governance.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See generally Althouse, supra note 8.
See id. at 1273.
Id. at 1272.
Id.; Printz, 521 U.S. at 940–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Althouse, supra note 8, at 1262.
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3. Commandeering opponents argue that the anti-commandeering rule
does not require an emergency exception given that subnational
governments will feel immense pressure to cooperate with federal
officials in circumstances that are appropriately classified as national
emergencies34 or when the situation is “dire.”35 According to this view,
the willingness of subnational jurisdictions to join the federal
government in a domestic security or criminal enforcement initiative is
itself a reliable test of the credibility of the federal government’s threat
and security claims.
The proliferation of immigrant sanctuary policies between 2001 and 2008
provides an excellent empirical case from which to assess these propositions.
After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, the
department’s subsidiary, ICE, looked to establish an augmented immigration
enforcement program using state and local police as surrogates.36 Select
officers would receive the authority to make arrests for the violation of federal
immigration laws and federal officials expected every police department, jail,
and prison to identify the unauthorized immigrants that came into their
custody.37
The federal government developed the collaborative initiative through the
287(g) provision of the IIRIRA of 199638 and the Criminal Alien Program
(CAP), which was eventually succeeded by “Secure Communities,” or SComm.39 Immigration enforcement partnership programs did not gain traction
at the subnational level until 2006 when the American public began to express
serious concern about the scale of unauthorized immigration.40

34. See Young, supra note 8, at 1291.
35. Althouse, supra note 8, at 1274.
36. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE:
A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 9 (2011), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf. See generally Adam B. Cox &
Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87 (2013) (“Today, local police are
being integrated into federal immigration enforcement on a scale never seen before in American
History.”).
37. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 36, at 5; Cox & Miles, supra note 36, at 93.
38. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 § 133,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1357).
39. Cox & Miles, supra note 36, at 93.
40. See infra Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Sanctuary Policies and Enforcement Partnerships, Cumulative
(2001–2008)41

Instead of walking in step with the DHS program, many subnational
jurisdictions obstructed the integration of the federal immigration system and
state and local criminal justice systems. Some in this group publicized their
stance, seemingly inviting a confrontation with the federal government.42 Each
sanctuary jurisdiction either prohibited or restricted local police collaboration
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, concluding that the ICE
partnership initiative undermined one or several local interests such as local
community solidarity and efficacy in local crime governance.43
In May of 2003, the state of Alaska based its decision to restrict police
participation in immigration enforcement on its objection to perceived federal
infringement of civil liberties.44 The Alaska immigrant sanctuary provision is
embedded within a broader range of restrictions preventing local police from
aiding federal officials in the exercise of new powers and authorities granted
by the Patriot Act.45 The city of Richmond, California, also objected to the
federal immigration enforcement campaign, but for very different reasons.46

41. Data on file with the author.
42. Cecilia M. Vega, San Francisco Promotes Services for Illegal Immigrants, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 3, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-promotes-servicesfor-illegal-immigrants-3219519.php; Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Reaches Out to Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/us/06immig.html?pagewanted=
print&_r=0; DreamActivist, San Fransisco–Sanctuary City, YOUTUBE (Apr. 4, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMzsUo2aM4U.
43. See Vega, supra note 42; see also McKinley, supra note 42.
44. H.R. J. Res. 22, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003).
45. Id.
46. See Richmond City Council, A Resolution of the Richmond City Council Reaffirming Its
Support For Comprehensive Immigration Reform That Is Fair, Just and Humane, Res. 11–07
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Richmond’s policy cited a shortage of agricultural labor and the dysfunction of
the national immigration system as its primary rationales.47
B.

Data on Immigrant Sanctuary Policy

Scholars have yet to systematically account for the rationales driving the
immigrant sanctuary movement or the legal mechanisms facilitating immigrant
sanctuary practice. I sought to fill this gap in the literature through an analysis
of immigrant sanctuary policy actions taken by subnational governments
between 2001 and 2008.48 I use the results of this analysis to assess the
aforementioned claims regarding the value of the anti-commandeering rule in
the context of security governance.
The population of sanctuary policies underlying the analysis were coded
for the time of enactment, the level of policy restriction, the state in which the
policy was enacted, the region of the country in which the policy was enacted,
the type of jurisdiction enacting the policy (i.e., city, county, or state), and the
rationale(s) expressed in the preamble of the policy. A review of the full slate
of immigrant sanctuary polices enacted between 2001 and 2008 revealed nine
primary rationales expressed across the seventy-five policies.
The immigrant sanctuary policies that populate the dataset derive from an
original list published by the National Immigration Law Center in 2009, titled,

(Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/archives/67/reso.%2011-07%20Immi
gration%20Reform.pdf.
47. Id.
48. (n=75). The policy timeline ends in 2008 due to the federal government’s shift in
immigration enforcement strategy. In 2008, federal officials launched the Secure Communities
program, which relies on a reflexive data sharing process that occurs between subnational police
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cox & Miles, supra note 36, at 93; see also AARTI
KOHLI ET AL., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY AT
UC BERKLEY SCHOOL OF LAW, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1–3 (Oct. 2011). For several decades, the FBI has provided a
courtesy criminal record-check service for state and local police, which all subnational police
departments utilize in criminal processing. The Secure Communities program simply inserted an
additional data-share mechanism in which every state and local police request to the FBI for a
criminal records check triggers a simultaneous check of the ICE immigration database. If the ICE
database check indicates that the detainee is an unauthorized immigrant or eligible for an
immigration related sanction, ICE issues a detainer for the criminal suspect. Consequently,
subnational enforcement partnering and immigrant sanctuary policy lost relevance after 2008
when the federal government introduced Secure Communities as a national program that would
trigger the immigration-status verification mechanism in response to any criminal records check
requested by state or local police. See Laura Sullivan, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the
Threat Posed to Sanctuary Law by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime
Information Center Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567, 583–85 (2009); see also Cox & Miles,
supra note 36, at 94–95.
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“Laws, Resolutions, and Policies Instituted Across the U.S. Limiting the
Enforcement of Immigration Laws by State and Local Authorities.”49
C. Findings and Analysis
The sanctuary policy dataset produced a series of findings that speak to the
three claims by commandeering opponents who hold, generally, that the anticommandeering rule in Printz provides important social and political benefits
in an era of centralized and opaque security governance.
Claim 1: The anti-commandeering rule undermines the hegemonic quality of
the domestic and national security narratives and concepts circulated by federal
officials.
The resurgence of the immigrant sanctuary movement after 2001
demonstrates the rupture of the federal security narrative by way of
counteractive measures by subnational governments.50 Abstaining jurisdictions
spanned the political spectrum—from conservative and politically moderate
states like Alaska, Montana, and New Mexico, to liberal enclaves like
Berkeley, California, and Ann Arbor, Michigan. The sanctuary policy actions
took the form of both legislative and administrative mechanisms,51 which
suggests that a variety of state and local government institutions challenged the
federal government’s cooperative enforcement initiative and the assertion of
cooperative immigration enforcement as essential to domestic security.
Table 1.1: Sanctuary Policy Actions, 2001-200852
Policy Mechanism

Total

Percentage

Ordinances

9

12.0%

Resolutions

50

66.7%

Police Orders

12

16.0%

Executive Orders

4

5.3%

Total Sanctuary Policy
Actions

75

100%

49. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (NILC), LAWS, RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES
INSTITUTES ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING THE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE
AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2009).
50. See infra Figure 1.2.
51. See infra Table 1.1.
52. Data on file with the author.
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Claim 2: The anti-commandeering rule functions as a platform for debate
between the federal government and subnational governments regarding the
precise meaning of domestic security.
The challenge posed by sanctuary jurisdictions introduced alternative
narratives regarding the relationship between unauthorized immigration and
domestic security.53 These oppositional security narratives can be found in the
preamble of the sanctuary policies themselves. In general, they contend that the
associated population is less stable, cohesive, and ordered (specifically, less
secure from physical, social, and economic harms and civil rights and civil
liberties violations) when its police partner with the federal government to
enforce federal immigration law.
Figure 1.2: Sanctuary Policy Rationales by Year54

When placed along a timeline, these oppositional narratives roughly
correspond to dominant security discourses at the federal level.55 For instance,
in 2003, just after the passage of the Patriot Act and creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, rationales related to the expansive federal power in the
field of security were the rationales most frequently cited across sanctuary
policies.56 Available evidence suggests that between 2001 and 2005, DHS
promoted cooperative immigration enforcement as necessary for its
counterterrorism strategy. However, in 2005, when federal officials pivoted to
a security narrative that claimed unauthorized immigration as a societal threat
in its own right (apart from its implications for counterterrorism), rationales
related to the impact of police participation in immigration enforcement on
police efficacy were the rationales most often expressed in sanctuary policy

53.
54.
55.
56.

See supra Figure 1.2.
Data on file with the author.
See supra Figure 1.2.
See infra Figure 1.3.
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actions. For example, most of the policy actions taken between 2006 and 2008
expressed concern that home raids by ICE damaged the relationship between
police and local immigrant communities.57 Other sanctuary policy actions in
the same time frame made the more general claim that police participation in
ICE diminished the police department’s ability to investigate, solve, and
prevent crimes. These correlations show attentiveness among state and local
governments to the specific security claims of DHS, and a discursive response
by dissenting jurisdictions, narrowly tailored to the federal security narrative of
the hour.58
Figure 1.3: Federal Overreach Rationales59

57. See infra Figure 1.4.
58. Letter from Mary Elizabeth Heffernan, Secretary for Massachusetts Governor Deval
Patrick, to Marc Rapp, Acting Director, Secure Communities (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security) (June 3, 2011) (on file with author).
Ethnographic and archival research could confirm and expand upon these findings. I did find
anecdotal evidence from several sanctuary jurisdictions showing that state and local officials
directly and often publicly challenged ICE’s claims regarding the threats associated with
unauthorized immigration, the proportion of criminal aliens in the unauthorized immigrant
population, and the credibility of the “criminal alien” classification.
59. Data on file with the author.
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Figure 1.4: Police Efficacy Rationales60

The data do a poor job of capturing nuance within the state and local
government objections to cooperative immigration enforcement. A qualitative
inquiry via case study, producing rich, fine-grained data regarding local
sentiment and related public debate would convey in clearer terms the nature
of the federal-subnational debate over enforcement and sanctuary. However,
the temporal analysis of the oppositional narratives in the immigrant sanctuary
policy preambles and the DHS immigration enforcement narratives show a
discursive exchange regarding the notion and pursuit of domestic security after
2001. This exchange reverberated in open letters between state and local
government attorneys, Homeland Security officials, and United States
Attorneys’ offices, and in the context of aggressive public advocacy from local
and federal politicians and immigrant rights groups.61 The study underlying
this article allows for a nation-level temporal analysis, but cannot account for
the robust debates in each jurisdiction that likely preceded the enactment of
any one immigrant sanctuary policy.

60. Data on file with the author.
61. Data on file with the author.; Jaxon Van Derberken, Feds Probe SF’s Minor Offender
Shield, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 29, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Fedsprobe-S-F-s-migrant-offender-shield-3206605.php; Don Babwin, Cook County Defies
Government on Immigration, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 4, 2011, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/
cook-county-defies-government-immigration.
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Claim 3: Subnational governments that opt for a combative, rather than
cooperative, stance in relation to a federal security initiative will make
exceptions in the interest of public safety.
Table 1.2: Level of Enforcement Restriction62
Level of Restriction

Level-1: Barring the use of government
resources for the enforcement of
immigration law (without clear
exception)
Level-2: Barring the use of government
resources for the enforcement of
immigration law with specific
exceptions.63
Level-3: Barring the use of government
resources for immigration enforcement
actions that target individuals solely
based on immigration status

Number of
jurisdictions

%

23

30.6%

31

41.3%

16

21.3%

Level-4: Objection to local participation
in immigration enforcement absent
meaningful restrictions

5

6.7%

Total

75

100%

My preliminary analyses show that most of the jurisdictions enacting
sanctuary policy between 2001 and 2008 included exceptions to the restrictions
on police participation in immigration enforcement. Moreover, the specified
restrictions fell along a continuum. To convey the variation in the degree to
which sanctuary policies restrict local officials from participating in
immigration enforcement, I classified sanctuary policies as belonging to one of
four levels of restriction.64 Fewer than one-third of the seventy-five sanctuary
policy actions do not include an exception. Thirty-one provide narrow

62. Data on file with the author.
63. Restriction exceptions have been coded as (a) serious crime (n=7), (b) criminal or traffic
offenses (n=23), and (c) permission by designated city official (n=1).
64. See supra Table 1.2.
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exceptions and twenty-one include broad exceptions. None of the policies
established a sanction for breach of the noncooperation policy.
State and local governments rarely place a total ban on cooperation in
immigration enforcement. Though many subnational governments vigorously
objected to the scope and intensity of the immigration enforcement campaign
launched after 2001, the policies stemming from such objections, more often
than not, included provisions that local officials believed would ensure public
safety. Level 3 and 4 restrictions, though present in only 28% of the policies,65
allow police considerable discretion in regard to the question of whether to
refer an unauthorized immigrant detainee to ICE.
The sanctuary policies articulated other exceptions common to state and
local legislation. Many of the city and county sanctuary resolutions and
ordinances instruct local officials to ignore sanctuary policy if required to do
so by “state or federal statute, regulation, or court decision.”66 This provision
acknowledges the ability of a state legislature to mandate cooperative
immigration enforcement by local police via state statute if it considers
enforcement cooperation essential to the preservation of security of state
residents.67 Put simply, states generally have the option of overriding city and
county sanctuary provisions. A functional immigrant sanctuary at the local
level therefore requires both a local sanctuary law or policy and the absence of
a preemptive state statute mandating local cooperation with federal officials.
III. SECURITY IDEOLOGY AND THE EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF STATE ACTION
A.

Immigrant Sanctuary as Functional Dysfunction

Commandeering proponents offer two additional arguments against the
Printz decision and a constitutionally assured fragmentation across American
law enforcement and security institutions. First, why should state and local
jurisdictions be permitted to obstruct federal immigration enforcement
initiatives in pursuit of democratic accountability? Would it not be more
effective to situate democratic accountability for domestic security policy at
the federal level, exercised through the state and local representatives who
serve in Congress? Given the diversity of threats facing the nation in the
Homeland Security era, political consensus regarding security governance
seems a clear prerequisite for strong security. If congressional representatives
(rather than state and local representatives) collectively determined the scope
and quality of domestic and national security initiatives, state and local police

65. See supra Table 1.2.
66. See, e.g., BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, REAFFIRMING BERKELEY AS A CITY
OF REFUGE, No. 63, 711-N.S. (2007).
67. While states generally can force local governments to cooperate in enforcement, the
federal government cannot.
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departments could freely participate in federal directives. Americans would
then, in theory, receive the benefit of both cohesive and democratically
accountable security governance. This model of democratic accountability
establishes a unified system free of the gaping holes in the nation’s security
umbrella caused by state or local enforcement abstinence policies.
What, then, makes the anti-commandeering rule and the opportunity it
provides for enforcement dysfunction a superior legal framework for security
governance? The social science literature on crime governance provides at
least one compelling answer. It shows that democratic accountability in the
field of crime governance runs along a continuum—it is strongest at the local
level and weakest at the level of federal government.68 Ordinary citizens
exercise meaningful influence over the quality of local policing and
punishment, but this influence wanes at the state and federal levels where wellorganized and well-funded interest groups thrive. Congressional
representatives are less responsive to citizen concerns than city council
members, making the security initiatives organized at the federal level and
dictated to local police departments an efficient and highly integrated model of
security governance, but a model in which local communities surrender control
of the local institutions built to serve them.
The creep of federal influence over local crime governance over the past
several decades only heightens concerns about federal commandeering in the
Homeland Security era.69 Political scientists have argued in recent years that in
contemporary American political life the citizens most affected by crime
policy lack the basic resources necessary to lobby at the federal level.
While some citizen groups seem to fare well on the national level, others—for
example neighborhood associations, community-based organizations, exoffenders groups, mothers’ and parents’ groups—are deeply embedded in local
contexts and often resource-poor, making it difficult to migrate across multiple
legislative venues. . . . Policymakers at higher levels seem largely insulated
from the policy priorities of these [resource-poor] groups, despite their
70
persistent and occasionally successful organizing efforts at the local level.

The distribution of political power in the field of crime and security
governance must be considered when contemplating a world without the anticommandeering rule. Federal influence over state and local police departments
is likely negatively correlated with the influence of the moderately resourced
political groups that aggressively advocate against penal excess or
“overcriminalization” at the local government level. In the best of

68. See LISA MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM (2010); see also WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
69. See CAPPS ET AL., supra note 36; see also Cox & Miles, supra note 36 (regarding the
technical innovations facilitating the Secure Communities program).
70. MILLER, supra note 68, at 6.
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circumstances, the groups come to exercise meaningful influence over local
crime policy. However, they find themselves at a severe disadvantage when
decisions regarding the quality of local policing are made at the state and
federal levels of government.
The slate of immigrant sanctuary policies passed after 2001 and predicated
on the Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in Printz frustrated the
efficient model of security governance that lies at the core of the Homeland
Security model. They asserted local democratic control of the police and in
many instances undermined the federal government’s national security
narratives regarding criminal aliens. Evidence from the underlying study
suggests that the incongruity between the federal government’s robust
immigration enforcement initiative after 2001 and the immigrant sanctuary
response fostered a dialogue in which immigrant sanctuary jurisdictions and
allied advocates asked the American public to at least consider the notion of
the unauthorized immigrant population as an essential part of the local
community rather than a criminal threat to the same. In a remarkable
transformation, the federal government, in response, has shifted from a plan
that initially targeted the entire unauthorized immigrant population for
deportation to a plan that targeted unauthorized immigrants in contact with the
criminal justice system, and later to a plan that ostensibly targeted
unauthorized immigrants charged with “serious crimes.” There are now
indications that the federal government may abandon the cooperative
immigration model entirely, which would all but sever the enforcement model
of deportation via criminal detention.71 It seems fair to say that the immigrant
sanctuary movement, though dysfunctional from the standpoint of efficient
security governance, played a part in this process of immigration enforcement
regression. Immigrant sanctuaries directly challenged the federal government’s
theory of security and conceptualization of criminal threat. This is not a story
of cooperation, efficiency, or synergistic management of a social problem, but
instead one of resistance. In the case of immigrant sanctuary, enforcement
resistance helped to transform American sensibilities in the field of security
governance, despite a long history of intergovernmental consensus on such
matters.
B.

Expressive Law and Social Meaning in Security Governance

The final critique of my analysis of the anti-commandeering rule would
likely call into question the impact of the immigrant sanctuary policies
themselves and incorporated rationales. How are we to understand the
71. Letter from Jeh Johnson, DHS Secretary, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director,
Secure Communities (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland
Security) (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_
1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf.
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significance of these policies in terms of their role in contesting and shaping
public perceptions of unauthorized immigrant presence? Fortunately, scholars
have carefully considered this question in a rich literature on “expressive law.”
This literature reveals the law’s expressive function and its power to transform
social meaning,72 particularly in instances in which the federal government’s
values and priorities conflict with those of subnational governments.73
An inquiry into the expressive quality of law should begin with a few
simple facts about the law itself. Some laws shape behavior by requiring
sanction for undesired behavior, while others, though having an enforcement
component, seek to shape social behavior primarily by “making statements”
that shape social norms. In the latter case, law is crafted to govern human
behavior by transforming social meaning rather than through coercion.74
Expressive law may ultimately fail to have any impact on public opinion or it
may fundamentally change social understandings.
Given the apparent political consensus after 2001 that security governance
must be cooperative across the various levels of government and the federal
campaign to utilize local police resources in combatting unauthorized
immigration, a normative shift that disentangled unauthorized immigrants from
notions of criminal and security threat seemed highly unlikely. Yet this is
exactly what happened over the course of the immigrant sanctuary campaign.
A sizeable number of jurisdictions, including many large American cities,
enacted immigrant sanctuary policy and in many instances articulated an
alternative understanding of unauthorized immigrant presence—one that cast
this recently maligned population as valued community members rather than as
criminals. In his model of expressive law, Cass Sunstein captures the cultural
thrust of the immigrant sanctuary policy movement.
What is perhaps less standard is to see the law as an effort to produce adequate
social norms. The law might either do the work of such norms, or instead be
designed to work directly against existing norms and to push them in new
directions. The latter idea is grounded on the view that law will have moral
weight and thus convince people that existing norms are bad and deserve to be
75
replaced by new ones.

If we are inclined to accept that the law has an expressive value and can
transform social meaning, how can we determine when the expressive quality
of law will find an audience or, alternatively, fall on deaf ears? The literature
suggests that the law is more likely to have an expressive quality when it is

72. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995);
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
73. Adam Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering
Rule, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309 (2000).
74. Id. at 2024–25.
75. Id. at 2031.
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local and well publicized. Americans tend to view local public law as an
indication of public beliefs about a particular issue, far more so than state or
federal public law. Scholars have argued that citizens lack full information
regarding public opinion and that the government, in passing laws, provides
one mechanism by which they come to understand local sentiment.76
Consequently, pending bills and enacted legislation brought to the public’s
attention have a greater likelihood of establishing the moral character of a
given community.
Immigrant sanctuary ultimately satisfies both of these criteria. Immigrant
sanctuary policies are concentrated at the local level, in cities and counties that
either oppose the use of police departments for federal rather than local
priorities or object to the treatment of unauthorized immigrants by the federal
government or in American society in general. The sanctuary policies have
also received considerable media attention given that they directly conflict
with a prominent federal security initiative and pertain to the contentious issue
of unauthorized immigration.
Expressive law holds unique value in the federalist system of governance,
particularly in instances in which state or local governments pass laws
challenging federal law or federal enforcement initiatives.77 Scholars have
argued that in challenging the federal government by way of expressive law,
state and local governments act as “alternative political institutions” rather than
merely alternative or subservient systems of governance. As semi-autonomous
political entities, subnational governments can reorient various national
debates using the expressive quality of public law. The value of this tool is
enhanced in fields like security governance, where the federal government
tends to dictate the terms of related national debates. In the new cooperative
paradigm of Homeland Security, the federal government seeks cooperative
arrangements with state and local government, but arrangements facilitated by
its own definition of domestic security and, likewise, its risk assessments of
groups historically stigmatized in American society. Such assessments are
often made in the aftermath of spectacular violence and in the midst of panic.
Through expressive law, state and local governments can provide alternative
security narratives and modes of security governance that penetrate national
anxieties and force rigorous debate on the security matter in question.
Expressive law thus provides special utility within the federal system of
governance, where state and local governments have the power to challenge,
disrupt, and even sink federal initiatives. I have attempted to argue,
additionally, that this is especially true in the field of security, where federal
cultural and administrative power reaches its apex. In the case of the immigrant
76. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339,
358 (2000).
77. See Cox, supra note 73, at 1323–27.
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sanctuary policy movement, state and local governments confronted the federal
attempt to integrate the immigration and criminal enforcement systems. The
federal government has incrementally retreated from the initiative and adopted
a fresh narrative of immigrant presence in which the “criminal alien” label is
no longer applied to unauthorized immigrants merely “in contact with” the
criminal justice system, but more narrowly to unauthorized immigrants
charged with serious offenses. This shift in enforcement indicates a change in
the social meaning attached to unauthorized immigrant presence, setting the
stage for more recent and ongoing modification of federal immigration
enforcement priorities.
CONCLUSION
Absent the Court’s conclusion that the federal government “lacks the
power to directly compel the States,”78 federal power in security governance,
despite its recent heights, would increase substantially. Law enforcement
resources at the subnational level greatly exceed those of the federal
government. Data from 2004 identified 12,766 local police departments, 3,067
county sheriff’s offices, 49 general service state law enforcement agencies, and
1,481 specialty agencies in the areas of transit, park, and campus policing,
among others. Federal security infrastructure is small in comparison, with the
total number of federal law enforcement agencies falling somewhere between
65 and 200 and the number of federal officers totaling around 105,000.79 The
total number of Americans working as full-time law enforcement personnel at
the subnational level stands at 1.1 million.80
Given these statistics, it seems all but certain that the consolidation of state
and local criminal justice resources for the purpose of federal ambitions in the
field of domestic security would translate to a fundamental redistribution of
government power. Among other things, it would likely establish a cultural and
administrative continuum between crime governance and security governance,
eliminating the distinction between criminal and national security matters that
has largely preserved an accepted division of labor between the federal and
subnational governments.

78. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
142, 166 (1992).
79. Daniel Stewart, Collaboration Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement: An
Examination of Texas Police Chiefs’ Perceptions, 14 POLICE Q. 407, 409 (2011).
80. BRIAN A. REAVES, DEP’T OF JUSTICE & BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF
STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (July 26, 2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/in
dex.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216.

